We empirically analyze exchanges of cost information in a multi-market oligopoly model for the airline industry with entry and incomplete information on marginal costs. We develop an algorithm to solve the Nash Equilibrium numerically. We estimate the structural model of supply decisions using data on the American Airlines and United Airlines duopoly at Chicago OHare airport. Our results provide probabilities of entry, expected quantities, prices, and prots on each market. Given the estimated parameters, we simulate competition under a hypothetical agreement to exchange cost information. We nd that such exchanges would benet airlines without hurting consumers.
Introduction
In the past ten years, the airline industry has witnessed a proliferation of marketing alliances. Within alliances, airlines are able to market and sell tickets on their partners ights and share revenues on joint ights. These practices, known as code sharing, require exchanges of information on production processes, particularly on costs of production. Given recent proposed alliances between major U.S. carriers, such as Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines, and American Airlines and US Airways, the implications of these cost information exchanges have become highly relevant. nd that, while exchanges of cost information raise expected prots in multi-market settings like the airline industry, expected consumer surplus may increase or decrease depending upon the models parameters. Since policy makers and courts in antitrust cases traditionally consider consumer surplus the deciding factor, this issue is signicant. In this paper, we estimate the structural parameters of a multi-market model of airline competition, and, to analyze how cost exchanges a¤ect consumer surplus, we run some simulations.
In the airline literature, the existing empirical models by Reiss and Spiller (1989) , Berry (1992) , Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1996) , analyze decisions on single-markets under complete information. We expand on the ndings of the earlier literature as we recognize that rms rarely observe their rivals costs accurately and entry into a market typically a¤ects the state of other markets. Namely, to analyze exchanges of cost information, we propose a static oligopoly model with incomplete information on costs and simultaneous entry decisions across multiple markets with demand complementarities. There are no xed costs and marginal costs are assumed to be random private signals, known to the rm but not its rivals. These are drawn from a joint distribution, which is common knowledge among rms. Our model is analytically intractable, and we propose an algorithm, based upon Monte-Carlo simulations, to determine the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium numerically.
We apply this model to American Airlines (AA) and United Airlines (UA) duopoly competition at Chicago OHare airport. The sample data, from the third quarter of 1993, includes 83 markets with ights from at least one of AA or UA, and 17 major markets with no ights. First, we estimate the demand functions, which we assume to be exogenous to the structural model. We then estimate the distribution of marginal costs with the structural inference method recently proposed by Florens, Protopopescu, and Richard (1999) for games of incomplete information. We nd an average cost per passenger/mile of $0.165. This gure is consistent with trade publications. Our method also provides probabilities of entry, expected quantities of passengers, prices, and prots.
The results closely match observed values.
Finally, we assume that AA and UA agree to exchange cost information truthfully.
In this scenario, the two airlines compete under complete information. Using the estimated distribution of marginal costs, we simulate and compare the airlines equilibrium decisions under both incomplete and complete information. As expected, the average prots increase on every market when AA and UA exchange cost information. Interestingly, these exchanges leave the expected consumer surplus essentially unchanged, and consumers typically benet on a majority of markets (57%). Hence, a marketing alliance between AA and UA to exchange cost information would be advantageous to airlines without hurting consumers.
The paper is structured as follows. We introduce the theoretic model in Section 2.
We propose an algorithm to solve the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the application to the airline industry. In Section 5, we discuss the structural estimation method and present our ndings. Section 6 then analyzes exchanges of cost information. Section 7 concludes.
A Model of Firms Decisions
To analyze exchanges of cost information, we develop the following theoretic model. The demand function on a market is common knowledge and exogenously determined. It is linear and symmetric across rms. If production is limited to one market, then goods on that market are perceived to be perfect substitutes across rms. Goods across markets are complements and expressed in a common unit. The price for a representative customer of rm i on market m, P i;m , is a non-negative function of quantity choices across all M markets:
where q i;m is rm is quantity on market m and ® m ;¯m;¸m;°m are parameters verifying ® m > 0;°m >¯m¸¸m > 0: This specication allows for the level of complementarity to di¤er across rms (i.e.,¯m¸¸m). Namely, a consumer who purchases a good may be more willing to buy another good from the same rm than from another rm. Brand loyalty or compatibility problems across brands may explain this behavior. 1 Hence, consumers willingness to pay for goods which would be considered perfect substitutes if there were no complementarities may vary. We also assume that rm i 0 s price on a market m is equally a¤ected by an increase in quantity on any market m 0 6 = m, even when m 0 is a new market. 2 We can interpret¯m and¸m as the marginal increase in a consumers willingness to pay for good m due to one more unit supplied on a market
Given their marginal costs, rms simultaneously decide whether to enter and how much to produce on each of the M markets. In other words, given c i ; rm i maximizes its expected prots across all M markets by selecting non-negative quantities q 
Computing the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Solution
To analyze exchanges of cost information, we need to derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We nd that there is no analytical solution to the problem, and we propose an algorithm, based upon Monte-Carlo simulations of the game, to nd the equilibrium solution numerically. This numerical technique is central to our analysis. We use it both to estimate the structural model and to quantify the e¤ects of cost information exchanges on consumer surplus.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the constrained optimization problem in (2. 
To determine equilibrium quantities, we need to solve the system of equations (3.5) and then (3.4) . Note that (3.5) 
A Numerical solution
To determine the Nash Equilibrium, we propose to replace E [qjµ] by an approximation
is the xed point solution of a problem matching a potential expected quantity to its empirical counterpart as calculated across Monte Carlo simulations.
For a given µ; we simulate S vectors of private types 4 (using the Common Random Number technique) for the representative rm i; fA c i;s g s=1;:::;S with A c i;s = (A c i;s;1 ; :::; A c i;s;M ) :
where " = (" 1 ; :::; " M ) is a potential value for E [qjµ]; q i (") = 4. An Application to the Airline Industry
American Airlines and United Airlines at Chicago OHare
In this section, we examine how our model applies to the airline industry. We dene an airline market as a pair of U.S. airports that can be linked by nonstop ights (hereafter ights). 5 A good on a market is a seat on a ight. If at least one carrier ies on a market, the market is said to be active. In the discussion that follows, we consider the competition between American Airlines (AA) and United Airlines (UA) at Chicago
OHare. We justify the maintained hypotheses of Section 2s model according to the following facts:
(i) Chicago OHare is a major hub for both airlines. 6 By nature, a hub is at the center of a self-contained network with demand complementarities across markets, as discussed by Morrison and Winston (1995) and Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997).
(ii) Following Brander and Zhang (1990) , AA and UA can be viewed as symmetric rms. They are major U.S. carriers with similar network-wide cost structures and brand images. In addition, their network of active markets is comparable at Chicago OHare.
(iii) At OHare, AA and UA are in duopoly competition, as assumed by Brander and Zhang (1990) . They jointly account for 90% of passenger enplanements, and, together, they are present on all of approximately 125 active markets at the airport. By comparison, Delta Airlines, the third largest airline at OHare, has only 3.1% of passenger enplanements and o¤ers ights on just 8 markets.
(iv) The internal structure of airline companies is such that a Marketing Group rst determines the aggregate number of passengers that y on each of the sample markets. In practice, changes in aggregated quantities are rare and costly, while we observe numerous price uctuations. This is consistent with a Cournot model where rms commit to quantities and then prices adjust through a tatonement process. This assumption is common to most empirical studies on the airline industry (e.g. Reiss and Spiller (1989) ). Note that we do not model capacity and ight frequency choices.
(v) There is incomplete information on costs. Average costs per passenger per mile for a given airline are made public ex-post on a network-wide basis (e.g. The Airline
Monitor (1994)). While AA and UA have information on each others leasing and servicing contracts, information about a markets main operating costs remains private information.
(vi) A static analysis of entry seems appropriate for this sample. The number of Chicago markets with ights, the number of ights per Chicago market, and the number of U.S. airlines with ights from OHare are stable through 1993-1994.
Data
Our data come from three databases: Databank 1A, Databank DS T-100, and the O¢cial Airline Guide (OAG) publications. Databank 1A, from the Department of Transportation (DOT), is a 10% random sample of all airlines tickets sold quarterly. It provides the itinerary and the price per mile for each passenger. 7 We consider itineraries that include nonstop ights between OHare and another US airport and ights connecting two US airports with a stop at OHare. To determine P i;m , we multiply the mileage of market m with the average price per mile for all passengers ying with airline i on market m.
Databank DS T-100 provides the number of passengers per major airline and per month on a market.
The sample data for our paper are from the 3 H@ quarter of 1993. There are M = 100
Chicago markets in our sample data (c.f. Appendix 1). Eighty-three have ights from one or both AA and UA. The other 17 are major markets without ights from any airline. 8 The sample does not include every Chicago market with ights. For lack of data, 17 markets are excluded. Another 27 markets are excluded as they are not part of the duopoly competition over the hub network for one of the following reasons: (i) a di¤erent airline dominates the market, (ii) the market links Chicago to another competitors hub, or (iii) AA and UA have di¤erent numbers of hub airports on the market. The inclusion of these markets would require to consider every possible airline and every potential market. Such task is beyond the scope of the present paper. In Table 1 , we present summary statistics of the 100 sample markets. Note that the average quantity and prices for AA and UA are slightly di¤erent. In an incomplete information framework, these di¤erences are not incompatible with an assumption of symmetry.
[ Table 1 roughly here]
Demand and Cost Specications
We now turn to a discussion of the demand and cost specications in the Chicago markets. We assume the demand functions are known to the rms and exogenously determined. Therefore, we need to estimate the demand function prior to the estimation of the structural model. We use data on the sample Chicago markets across seven consecutive quarters: the 1 JD quarter 1993 through the 3 H@ quarter 1994. The inverse demand function faced by airline i on a market m in quarter t is equal to where ® 0 ; :::; ® 6 ;¯;¸;°are parameters known to the airlines, and " i;m;t is the error term.
MILES m is the mileage of market m; INC m and P OP m are, respectively, the median household income and the population for the metropolitan area paired to Chicago on market m. DP OP m is a dummy variable equal to 1 if that metropolitan area has more than 2,600,000 inhabitants (source: 1990 Census data). QT R t is AA and UAs average number of passengers in quarter t on U.S. markets (other than the 100 markets in our sample) active during all seven quarters.
The theoretic model is sequential since rms choose quantities and then observe realized prices. Under the models assumptions, there is therefore no endogeneity problem between prices and quantities. To allow for correlations between unobservable variables on duopoly markets, we use the Feasible Generalized LeastSquares method. A preliminary estimation of (4.1) reveals that¸(the level of complementarity across rms) is insignicant at a 5% level. This result is consistent with Morrison and Winston (1995) who nd that, by 1994, less than 1% of all passengers switch airlines in their path of travel. We re-estimate the inverse demand function under the constraint that¸= 0. We present our results in Table 2 . We subsequently derive rms optimal strategies using this estimated demand function.
[ Table 2 roughly here]
AA and UA have long-term leases on their facilities at OHare and we consider xed airport costs (i.e., administrative costs, costs of leasing facilities and ground equipment)
as sunk prior to the sample period. Following Brander and Zhang (1990) and Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan Brander and Zhang (1990) ). We estimate the distribution of the private types cpm i;m in the following section, using the structural econometric model.
Estimation of the Structural Model of Firms Decisions

Inference Method
Estimating the distribution of airlines private costs requires non-standard econometric techniques. Indeed, in models of incomplete information, as in the case of the air- 
The unfeasible estimator is given by the censored Maximum Likelihood estimator: Computing is of the order of 274 minutes of CPU time on a recent SUN workstation.
Standard deviations for the estimates are computed with a Monte Carlo simulation of size 5000.
Estimation Results
We nd the estimates for the parameters of the cost distribution to be > µ = (? ¹ This indicates that network-wide averages are an imperfect measurement of the marginal cost on a given market. This nding reinforces our assumption of incomplete information at the market level in the case of the airline industry.
The simulations within the algorithm provide, for each market, expected quantities, prices, prots, and the probability that a rm will enter (see Tables 3 and 4 ). The estimated probabilities of entry are consistent with the observed number of active rms or airlines on a sample market. Namely, the average probability that a rm enters a market is equal to 0.84 across markets in duopoly in our sample, 0.66 across sample markets in monopoly, and 0.36 across inactive sample markets. As shown in Table 4 , estimated quantities and prices t the observations for AA and UA well. We estimate that AA earned expected prots of $34,120,907, while UA earned $43,897,404 during the sample period, conditional upon observed entry decisions. Note that these gures do not include all sunk costs and that they are consistent with previous studies (c.f. Borenstein (1989) , Brander and Zhang (1990) ). A markets consumer surplus is equal to°(
is the quantity AA (UA) produced on that market.
The disparity in expected quantities across markets explains the large standard deviation associated with the average consumer surplus in Table 3 . Finally, a regression indicates that expected quantities do not have a signicant e¤ect on estimated marginal costs (the p-value=0.58). This result conrms that there are no economies of density in our sample markets.
[ Tables 3 and 4 roughly here]
Exchanges of Cost Information in Airline Alliances
We now quantify the e¤ects of exchanges of cost information as they pertain to the AA/UA duopoly at OHare. Armantier and Richard (2000) show that this result need not hold in multi-market models with entry and complementarities across markets. When complementarities are di¤erent across rms, changes in production decisions may yield greater expected consumer surplus for rms that exchange cost information (see example in Appendix 2).
The authors also nd that consumers on smaller markets tend to benet more.
Following Shapiro (1986) , we assume that, before observing their own cost vector, rms agree to exchange cost information. ! Under this agreement, rms truthfully reveal to each other their costs vector c i and then compete under complete information by selecting an output level for each of the M markets. Following FGS, we assume that rms can transfer and verify each others reports at no cost. All previous assumptions regarding demand and costs are maintained. Under complete information, the Nash Equilibrium obtains numerically from the rst-order conditions of the rms optimization problem. To estimate expected prots and consumer surplus, we simulate competition under the agreement over the 100 sample markets. Private signals are simulated from the distribution estimated in section 5.2. The results of these simulations are summarized in Table 5 and compared to those in Table 3 .
[ Table 5 roughly here]
There is a larger probability that a market is active under complete information.
Markets having a low probability of entry under incomplete information see the largest relative increases. Markets are more likely active and in monopoly and less likely to be in duopoly under complete information. Expected prots are consequently larger on every market (expected aggregated prots increase by 30%). Hence, rms benet by entering into an agreement to exchange cost information. Under complete information, expected aggregated consumer surplus decreases by only 4%. Consumer surplus is also larger on most markets (57%) under complete information. Consumers on small markets (i.e., markets with low expected quantities) benet the most since these markets are more likely to be active. In summary, exchanges of cost information improve expected prots and increase consumer surplus on a majority of markets.
Conclusion
Our objective in this study was to extend the existing literature by analyzing the e¤ect of exchanges of cost information in the airline industry. We consider a multi-market model of competition with entry and incomplete information. In addition, we developed a numerical method to calculate the equilibrium solution. The subsequent structural estimation and simulations revealed that exchanges of cost information increase prots and leave consumer surplus essentially unchanged. This result contrasts with previous ndings in single-market industries.
Our results are limited to the American Airlines and United Airlines duopoly at Chicago OHare airport, and they may not generalize to alliances at other airports.
Our model also pre-supposes the existence of a mechanism to truthfully and costlessly exchange information. Such a mechanism may be di¢cult to implement in practice.
Finally, actual marketing alliances in the airline industry are not limited to exchanges of cost information. Other components, such as coordination of ight schedules for instance, may impair competition and a¤ect our conclusions.
Agreements to exchange cost information may have either a positive or a negative e¤ect on consumer surplus in multi-market settings. Policy-makers should therefore determine the nature of this e¤ect before approving any such agreement. The combination of theory, econometrics, and numerical analysis in the present paper provides a powerful tool to quantify precisely how exchanges of cost information a¤ect consumer surplus.
The analysis of competition under incomplete information in the airline industry can be extended to the structural estimation of models with asymmetric airlines, endogenous demand and/or dynamic decision-making. The methodology can also be applied to other multi-market industries with demand complementarities, such as, for instance, the home electronics and the software industries. We are currently exploring these possibilities. 12. Detailed results are available upon request.
Tables
13. This agreement is purely hypothetical and we are not aware of any plans by AA and UA to form a marketing alliance on the U.S. market.
higher in multi-market models when rms truthfully exchange cost information. Tables A1 and A2 summarize 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Under complete information, expected prots and expected consumer surplus increase respectively by 32% and 8%. Note also that under complete information, the probability that a rm is in monopoly (duopoly) increases (decreases) and the quantity produced by a monopolistic (duopolistic) rm increases (decreases) sharply. 
